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The role of language connectedness in reducing home bias in trade, investment, information, 





This study introduces the concept of a country’s language connectedness (LC), namely, the extent to which 
the country is connected to the rest of the world in terms of the number of potential communicative partners. 
LC depends on the extent to which the country’s languages are spoken outside that country. Operationalizing 
and constructing an index capturing LC, I empirically show that a country’s LC is strongly associated with its 
globalization level. This effect is particularly strong in cross-border trade and investment and information 
flows. I also find that countries with languages belonging to large linguistic families (i.e., countries with 
greater linguistic connectedness) are more globalized. This study presents language barriers as a key 
contributor to home bias, that is, the tendency toward more within-border than cross-border interactions. 
 
 
JEL classification: F2; F21; F23; F15 






In spite of the hype about the “death of distance” and the world becoming a “global village,” research 
demonstrates that national borders continue to limit international economic integration, and the extent of 
globalization differs significantly from country to country. Factors that affect a country’s degree of 
participation in cross-border activities are of great interest to policymakers. A country’s participation in cross-
border activities is affected by the ability of its people—or at least those directly involved in cross-border 
activities—to speak the languages of other countries. This study examines the concept of language 
connectedness (LC), which is the extent to which a country is connected to the rest of the world in terms of the 
number of potential communicative partners. LC depends on the languages used in the focal country and the 
extent to which these languages are spoken outside the focal country. I operationalize and construct an index of 
LC using the recently released Ethnologue Global Dataset (Lewis et al., 2014), which characterizes the 
population of each of 234 countries and their 7,479 languages. The LC index considers each country’s 
language repertoire and captures the extent to which all these languages are spoken outside that country. Based 
on this index, I empirically show that a country’s LC is a key enabler of its globalization, and I thus posit 
language barriers as a key contributor to home bias, that is, the tendency to have more within-border than 
cross-border interactions (sometimes also referred as the border effect). 
This study makes several important contributions to the literature. In contrast to previous studies that have 
investigated language differences among countries at either a unilateral or bilateral level (Tenzer et al., 2017), 
this study takes a multilateral perspective by evaluating each country’s language repertoire against the 
language composition of the rest of the world. From this perspective, the idea of LC is novel, as is the LC 
index. Second, this study brings language to the forefront of discourses that attempt to explain the spatial 
dynamics of globalization. Scholars have looked at a variety of ways in which places are connected across 
space, the most prominent of which are distance, relative location, accessibility, and situation (Sheppard, 
2002); however, it is rather surprising that the language aspect has received less attention here, particularly 
given the crucial role of language in facilitating cross-border interpersonal contact and interactions. Third, 
national competitiveness, a concept that has attracted wide academic interest, has been examined in various 
dimensions (Schueth, 2011; Schwab, 2014; Snowdon and Stonehouse, 2006); however, the linguistic 
dimension has been largely neglected. Moreover, national competitiveness depends on a country’s ability to 
integrate itself within the world economy (Snowdon and Stonehouse, 2006). In examining how LC affects this 
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ability, this study makes another contribution. One can view the country of origin of various actors/entities, 
such as multinational enterprises (MNEs), engaged in cross-border activities as either a resource or a liability. 
Although researchers have looked at various aspects of home country–specific advantages (or disadvantages), 
such as the home country’s institutional context, infrastructure, technological development, and 
product/market development (Moeller et al., 2013; Önsel et al., 2008), language has received limited attention. 
When significant portions of a country’s population share a common language with the citizens of other 
countries, this can be an advantage for engaging in cross-border activities. This linguistic advantage—or the 
lack of it—can have implications for firms, individuals, and products/services that cross national boundaries. 
As Rose (2008) suggests, a country can also enjoy a kind of soft power when its language(s) is widely spoken 
outside the country. LC provides a more comprehensive concept for gauging the relative linguistic advantage 
(or disadvantage) of countries. I believe various research and policy domains, particularly discourses in 
international business/economics and national language policies, will find this research useful. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the literature relevant to the concept 
of country-level globalization (and home bias) and its determinants. Section 3 introduces the concept of a 
country’s LC and proposes how a higher LC can lead to greater integration with the rest of the world (or a 
smaller home bias). An index capturing LC is operationalized and constructed in Section 4. Section 5 presents 
the methodology and the empirical results of the econometric analysis to assess the impact of LC on country-
level globalization. Finally, Section 6 provides discussions and a conclusion. 
 
2. Background 
Scholars of economics, international business, and other fields have all contributed to the scholarly discussion 
of globalization, but they do so by emphasizing different dimensions. Economists and scholars of international 
business usually define globalization as a process of greater integration within the world economy through the 
movements of goods and services, capital, technology, and (to a lesser extent) labor (Jenkins, 2004). This study 
takes an economic perspective. As depicted in many portrayals, such as in “the world is flat,” global village, 
death of distance, “end of geography,” “death of the nation state,” and “hyperglobalization,” the last few 
decades have long been considered a period of accelerated globalization (albeit with moderation and possible 
reversal recently) by both academia and the popular press. However, economic activity still remains largely 
within national borders. For example, Stulz (2005) demonstrates that the extent of financial globalization is 
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limited, even though explicit barriers to financial globalization have significantly fallen since the 1940s. In the 
Depth Index of Globalization report, Ghemawat and Altman (2013) show that a preponderance of nearly every 
type of activity they measured takes place within national borders, reflecting what they term home bias. They 
also reveal that the extent of globalization differs significantly from country to country. Carrieri et al. (2013) 
concur that the degree of market integration is considerably lower for emerging economies than for developed 
markets, and Ajide et al. (2019) emphasize that the African region has a low level of globalization. 
Two streams of research have extensively examined the causes of home bias in investment and trade, that is, 
why trade and investment disproportionately take place within the home country rather than in a foreign 
country (e.g., Daly and Vo (2013); Evans (2003); Mishra and Ratti (2013); Yi (2010)). In the Depth Index of 
Globalization report, Ghemawat and Altman (2013) focus on measuring the degree of globalization of 
countries, but they have statistically analyzed the relative explanatory power of five factors: the gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita, remoteness, population, whether the country is landlocked, and linguistic 
commonality. They find that the first three factors explain more than 62 percent of the variation in their 
globalization index. Their linguistic commonality variable measures the proportion of the rest of the world’s 
GDP sharing an official language with the country in question. The current study builds on and expands on 
Ghemawat and Altman’s understanding of linguistic commonality. It does so by first considering the number 
of language speakers. LC also recognizes the complexity of language composition in countries. LC is more 
representative in terms of languages, since Ghemawat and Altman (2013) have only considered whether 
countries share an official language, let alone considering major languages. They also ignore the fact that 
people in different countries can communicate via a non-native language or a lingua franca. For example, 
English has emerged as the dominant lingua franca in international business and facilitates cross-border 
activities not only between English-speaking countries, but also between countries that have different 
languages, in what is known as an interlanguage effect, or lingua franca effect (Hejazi and Ma, 2011). Since 
English is spoken as a second language in many countries, consideration of only the official language, ignoring 
second language capabilities, can also introduce considerable bias. 
 
3. A country’s LC and its role in reducing home bias 
Ample evidence suggests that language differences between two countries are one of the key barriers that 
obstruct trade, investment, and other types of cross-border transactions/flows between them. A range of studies 
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find a positive and significant relation between the presence of a common language between two countries and 
bilateral trade between them. In a review of studies on this effect, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) estimate 
that language barrier amount to the equivalent of a tariff of 5–12 percent. Egger and Lassmann (2012) also find 
that a common language between two countries directly increases trade flows between them by 44 percent. 
Similarly, language can play an important role in foreign direct investment (FDI). Effective interactions 
through a common language enable investors to distinguish good from bad investments and improve post-
investment management and returns, thus increasing subsequent investments (Goldberg et al., 2005). Several 
studies have found strong evidence of a negative relation between the language differences between two 
countries and bilateral FDIs between them (Goldberg et al., 2005; Hejazi and Ma, 2011; Oh et al., 2011). Even 
in foreign portfolio investment (FPI), a mode of investment that demands relatively little foreign investor 
involvement, language appears to be a factor that determines investors’ origin. Mishra (2007) finds that a 
common language between two countries increases equity investment between them by 35 percent, and 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) show that investors prefer to hold and trade the securities of firms that publish 
their annual reports in the investors’ native language. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that language also influences cross-border human interaction via 
telecommunications and Internet networks. For example, followers who retweet on Twitter are likely to share a 
common language with the original tweeter, and people who communicate in MSN Messenger are 27 times 
more likely to speak the same language as people who do not (Ghemawat and Altman, 2013). It is commonly 
accepted that language is one of the most important skills that determines immigrants’ access to employment 
and earning levels (Danzer and Dietz, 2014; Toomet, 2011). Bartz and Fuchs-Schündeln (2012) show that 
language borders are one of the major reasons for the lack of labor market integration across borders within the 
EU-15 countries. Similarly, the ability to communicate in the destination country’s language can be quite 
useful for international tourists and students. 
Therefore, if language plays a crucial role in determining counterparts in cross-border activities/interactions, 
then, based on the same logic, the degree to which a country’s languages are spoken abroad should influence 
the tendency to locate an activity within the home country, as opposed to outside it. For example, because of 
the status of English in the world, English-speaking countries could have a greater potential to integrate with 
the rest of the world. In contrast, countries dominated by languages not widely spoken outside could 
experience a larger home bias. For example, differences in languages can increase the liability of foreignness 
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of actors/entities engaging in cross-border activities and could restrict the extent of their cross-border activities 
(increasing home bias). 
Every language has a different degree of reach around the globe. Given the network externality effects 
associated with languages, the more people use a particular language, the more useful and powerful that 
language becomes (Church and King, 1993; Grin, 2002). This effect can be contrasted with the utility–scarcity 
relation in commodities, resources, and other skills/competencies, which tend to gain in value and utility with 
scarcity. The network externality effect of language is likely applicable to both individuals and countries. 
Therefore, if a language(s) spoken in a country is widely spoken outside the country, then that country has an 
advantage in terms of connecting with the outside world. While researchers generally describe the network 
externality effect in relation to individuals, the current research tests this effect in relation to countries. 
In sum, a country of people who can communicate with a larger fraction of the world will have a relative 
advantage in terms of engaging in cross-border activities and, therefore, a higher potential to engage with the 
outside world. Individuals and firms originating from such countries will be able to engage with a larger 
fraction of the world with ease and could thus have more opportunities in a wider geographical region outside 
their home country. Such countries can also attract the inbound activities from many potential communicative 
partners outside the country. In contrast, individuals and firms originating from countries where fewer 
residents can communicate with people in other countries could face greater liability of foreignness when they 
engage in cross-border activities. For example, a firm originating from a country that uses a vernacular 
language that is not spoken outside the home country is likely to be linguistically bound and is, therefore, 
likely to face significant challenges in expanding its activities beyond its national border. Therefore, countries 
with higher LC are likely to be more globalized (or to have a lower home bias), ceteris paribus. 
 
4. Operationalization of LC 
To construct a measure of LC that is useful for explaining the extent of globalization, we need to understand 
how a country’s language composition can influence its potential for a cross-border interaction, as opposed to a 
within-country interaction. Accordingly, I attempt to capture the proportion of potential communicative 




To operationalize LC, I denote the world by the subscript w, the languages in the world by the subscript j (j = 
1, …, n), the countries in the world by the subscript i (i = 1, …, k), and the population that speaks language j in 
country i by Pij. For a given language j, all the speakers in the world, Pwj, are distributed both inside the 
country (Pij) and outside the country (Pwj - Pij), where 
    k  
 Pwj = Σ  Pij                                                                                             (1) 
   i=1 
 
Individuals in country i who speak language j have the opportunity to interact with a population Pij inside the 
country and a population Pwj - Pij outside the country. Of the total number of potential communicative partners, 
the proportion of potential communicative partners outside the country is then: 
   
Pwj - Pij                                                   (2) 
    Pwj  
 
For further illustration, if we assume all the speakers of a language are distributed inside and outside the 
country according to a 20:80 ratio, then the distribution of potential communication partners will be 20 percent 
within the country and 80 percent outside the country. If the individual has no preference between choosing an 
outsider and an insider (ceteris paribus), then that person has a propensity of 80 percent of interacting with 
someone outside the country. 
Given all the people in the country and extending the same construct to all languages (j = 1, …, n), the 
country’s LC index is  
        n     
 
LCi = Σ (Pwj - Pij) × Pij                             (3)       Pwj Pi  
   j=1     
where Pi is the total population in country i and Pij/Pi represents the fraction of the population who speaks 
language j in country i. In essence, LC is constructed by calculating (Pwj - Pij)/Pwj for each language and 
weighting this ratio by the fraction of the population in that country who speaks that language, Pij/Pi, and, 
finally, taking the aggregate over all languages. 
I illustrate the index with three simple examples. First, let us take a country with only one language. If no 
one outside the country speaks the language, then LC takes the value of zero, indicating a 0 percent potential of 
the population in that country communicating with the outside world, ceteris paribus. Second, if speakers of 
this language are distributed between inside and outside the country on a 50:50 basis, then LC takes the value 
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of 0.5, indicating a 50 percent potential of the population in the country communicating with the outside world, 
ceteris paribus. Third, let us take a country with two languages, where 60 percent of the population speaks the 
first language and 40 percent speak the second. If speakers of the first language are distributed inside and 
outside the country on a 10:90 basis and speakers of the second language on an 80:20 basis, then LC can be 
computed as follows: 
LC = (0.60 × 0.90) + (0.40 × 0.20) = 0.54 + 0.08 = 0.62 
 
Note that the contribution of each language to the LC index is different: this country’s LC is mainly higher 
because of the first language. In this construction, the LC index can be larger than 1.0 because of the presence 
of bilingual/multilingual speakers. Compared to monolingual speakers, bilingual/multilingual speakers have 
greater linguistic capital and could have a broader linguistic reach, thus contributing to their countries’ 
linguistic capital. For example, as per the Ethnologue Global Dataset, in Singapore about 61 percent speak 
English, 41 percent speak Mandarin, and 8 percent speak Malay, with many other minority languages also 
spoken. This multilingualism significantly increases Singapore’s population’s potential to connect with the 
outside world, for example, with countries where Mandarin, Chinese dialects, Malay, or English is spoken. 
Therefore, Singapore’s LC index is above 1.0, at 1.248. Of course, the linguistic capital of bilingual and 
multilingual speakers depends on their languages being spoken by significant numbers of people outside their 
country. For instance, India has many bilingual and multilingual speakers, but it has an LC index of 0.23 
because the international reach of languages such as Hindi is very limited (Maurais and Morris, 2003; 
McConnell, 2003). 
I use the recently released Ethnologue Global Dataset to calculate the LC index. Ethnologue: Languages of 
the World is widely regarded as the most comprehensive reference volume on language currently available and 
is widely used (e.g., Bartz and Fuchs-Schündeln (2012)). Ethnologue released its Ethnologue Global Dataset 
for the first time in 2014, allowing researchers to directly use the data in their own analyses. It contains 
statistics on country-level language speakers for 234 countries and 7,479 languages. These data allow our 
calculations to encompass bilingual and multilingual speakers, a significant advantage over previous language-
related studies that consider only first-language speakers, particularly since many internationally important 
languages are widely spoken as a second language. For example, of all the English language speakers in the 
Ethnologue dataset (840 million), only 40 percent speak it as a first language. 
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Table 1 presents the top five and bottom five countries in the LC index, while Appendix A reports the LC 
index for all the countries included in this study. Luxembourg leads the index, largely due to its 
multilingualism (Education First, 2015; Fettes, 2003). European countries dominate the top part of the table; 
seven of the top 10 countries are European. This could be attributed to the fact that most European countries 
explicitly promote multilingualism and intercultural communications among their citizens (Education First, 
2015; Fettes, 2003; Rose, 2008). Japan is ranked last, reflecting the fact that Japanese is scarcely spoken 
outside of Japan and few Japanese speak English (Kaiser, 2003). 
The LC index does not consider the fact that some languages are more closely related than others. 
Languages with a common origin tend to have similar syntaxes, and people find it easier to understand and 
learn languages that share a common origin with their first languages than those belonging to different families 
(Chiswick and Miller, 2005; Cuypers et al., 2015). To account for this, I construct another index to capture the 
extent to which the country’s language(s) are closer to the languages outside the country. I use the genetic 
classification in the Ethnologue (Lewis et al., 2014), which classifies all the languages into 141 different 
language families (top-level genetic groups). Some language families are more extensive than others. For 
example, the top six language families (each comprising at least 5 percent of the world’s languages) together 
account for nearly two-thirds of all languages and five-sixths of the world’s population (Lewis et al., 2014). 
Countries with languages that belong to a major language family are likely to be more linguistically connected 
with the outside world than countries with languages that belong to a minority language family. 
To account for the role of language families, I measure linguistic connectedness (LIC). The process is the 
same as for the LC index, but I consider the 141 different language families reported in Ethnologue instead of 
the 7,479 languages. In essence, to construct the index for a country, I consider each language family and 
measure the proportion of speakers of the languages of that language family who are outside the country; I 
then weight this quantity by the fraction of the population that speaks the languages of that language family; 
finally, I take the aggregate over all the language families.  
Table 2 presents the top five and bottom five countries in the LIC index, while Appendix A reports the LIC 
index for all the countries included in this study. As for the LC index, European countries dominate the LIC 
index, largely due to the presence of multilingualism and because European languages belongs to the Indo-
European language family, the most widespread language family in the world (Lewis et al., 2014). Some 
countries that have very low connectedness in terms of LC have better connectedness in terms of LIC. A 
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notable exception is Japan. Japan remains the most linguistically isolated country, with a very low LIC index 
(0.02), since the Japanese language belongs to the Japonic language family, which consists of languages that 
are largely spoken in Japan. 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1 Data and methodology 
Following Ghemawat and Altman (2013), I consider a country’s integration with the rest of the world as 
manifested by its participation in international flows of products and services, capital, information, and people. 
I employ the country-level depth index of globalization (DIG) reported by Ghemawat and Altman (2013) to 
measure each country’s degree of external integration with the rest of the world, the key dependent variable in 
this study. The variable DIG is a measure of the fraction of transactions that take place across borders out of all 
the transactions that take place within and across borders. This index is a multidimensional measure of 
globalization that is based on four pillars: trade (exports/imports of merchandise/services), capital (FDI and 
FPI), information (the Internet, phone calls, and printed publication trade), and people (migrants, tourists, and 
international students). For each activity, the extent of a country’s cross-border flows is estimated compared to 
the overall (domestic and cross-border) measure in question or the domestic measure.1 Unlike other 
globalization indexes, such as the KOF Index of Globalisation (Dreher, 2006), the index of Ghemawat and 
Altman (2013) distinguishes between cross-border flows and their enablers and only uses actual cross-border 
flows. The KOF Index of Globalisation includes such measures as import barriers, trade tariffs and taxes, the 
number of embassies, and international call tariffs, all of which are globalization enablers (Zinkina et al., 
2013). 
The key explanatory variable in this study is the LC index (LC). By construction, it corresponds well to the 
operationalization of DIG and is well suited for explaining it. The variable DIG measures the proportion of an 
economy’s activities or flows that are international. In a similar analogy, the LC index captures the proportion 
of speakers of the country’s language(s) outside the country. The LC index captures the potential of having a 
cross-border interaction via a common language versus a within-country interaction via a common language. If 
we control for other factors that can affect globalization, then we can separate the effect of LC on the 
globalization level. Therefore, I specify the following representation, controlling for country size, 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 7 of Ghemawat and Altman (2013).  
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approximated by population; income level, approximated by the GDP per capita (GDPPC); economic growth 
rate (GDPG); geographical connectedness (GC); whether the country is landlocked; the extent of regional 
integration (RTA Size); human capital (HC); infrastructure; tax rate (Tax); trade tariffs (Tariffs) and the level of 
economic freedom (EF): 
DIG = β0 + β1LC + β2GC + β3Landlocked + β4RTA Size + β5Population + β6 GDPPC + β7 GDPG + β8Tax 
+ β9Tariff + β10Infrastructure + β11HC + β12EF                                                                   (4) 
Appendix B provides the variable measurements and data sources. Geographical connectedness (GC), that is, 
physical closeness to the rest of the world, can facilitate globalization (Ghemawat and Altman, 2013). 
Controlling for geographical connectedness is particularly important, since countries with similar languages 
tend to be closely clustered. Based on a common approach to measure the geographical concentration of firms 
around a focal firm (e.g., Dai et al. (2013); Sorenson and Audia (2000), for each country i, I weight the GDP of 
all the others (where j ≠ i and j = 1, …, n) by the inverse of their distance from the focal country2 (1/Dij) and 
then aggregate the weighted GDP measures:  
     N   
  GCit = Σ       GDPjt                                                 (5)    Dij  
   j(≠i)=1   
 
The variable Landlocked is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the country is landlocked and zero 
otherwise. A landlocked country has national borders on all sides, which is a significant barrier to its 
integration with countries beyond its neighbors (Collier and Gunning, 1999). Regional integration can directly 
increase trade and facilitate cross-border investment and people flows (Medvedev, 2012; Moshirian, 2008). 
The variable RTA Size represents the extent to which the country is regionally integrated, operationalized by 
the cumulative market size that is linked through regional trade agreements (RTAs). Following Medvedev 
(2012), for each country, I aggregate the GDPs of all the countries that share an RTA with the focal country, as 
follows:3  
      N  
  RTA Sizeit =  Σ  (GDPjt × RTAijt)                                             (6) 
   j(≠i)=1 
                                                 
2 The GDP data are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) and the distance data are from Rose and Spiegel 
(2011). 




where RTAijt is a binary variable that takes the value of one if country i and country j share an RTA at time t. 
 
Population, GDPPC (GDP per capita), and GDPG (GDP growth rate) represent the size, income level, and 
economic growth rate, respectively.4 Country size tends to be inversely related to globalization, while the 
country’s income level and economic growth rate tend to be positively related to globalization (Ghemawat and 
Altman, 2013; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008; Moshirian, 2008). The variables Tax and Tariff are the 
country’s total tax rate and average rate of trade tariffs, respectively.5 Lower trade tariffs can facilitate both 
imports and exports, as well as attract export-oriented FDI. Lower tax rates can increase the competitiveness of 
exports and attract foreign investments (Tanzi, 1996). Various aspects of a country’s domestic environment 
and competitiveness in terms of skills and resources are likely to offer incentives (or disincentives) for cross-
border activities. In particular, a country’s institutional environment, infrastructure facilities, and human 
capital skills, for example, can entice foreign firms to locate their value-added activities there (Globerman and 
Shapiro, 2002; Kinda, 2010; Moshirian, 2008) and facilitate the expansion and global competitiveness of 
native firms (Makhija et al., 1997). Therefore, I control for the quality of a country’s overall infrastructure, 
human capital level, and economic freedom, and I expect these to have a positive effect on the globalization 
level. The variable Infrastructure is a multi-indicator measure of infrastructure.5 It is a composite variable 
based on the quality of the country’s overall infrastructure, roads, railroad infrastructure, port infrastructure, 
and air transport infrastructure; the number of available airline seat kilometers; the quality of its electricity 
supply; and the numbers of mobile telephone subscriptions and fixed telephone lines. The variable HC 
represents the level of human capital as measured by the gross secondary school enrollment rate. The variable 
EF is the Index of Economic Freedom,6 which is based on the following 10 dimensions: business freedom, 
fiscal freedom, government spending, monetary freedom, trade freedom, investment freedom, financial 
freedom, property rights protection, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom. Finally, I include a series of 
year dummies to control for year-specific effects. The sample covers 114 countries7 and the period 2006–2012.  
Table 3 presents summary statistics and correlation coefficients. The mean value of the LC index is 0.66, 
with a standard deviation of 0.43, indicating considerable variation in the LC index across countries. We can 
                                                 
4 Source: WDI. 
5 Source: Global Competitiveness Index. 
6 Source: Heritage Foundation. 
7 The choice of countries was based on data availability.  
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make a similar observation in terms of the LIC index. The LC and LIC indexes are positively correlated with 
the depth index of globalization, although we cannot ascertain the effect of the LC and LIC indexes without 
controlling for the other determinants of globalization. 
Before the empirical results are presented, a few econometric concerns require attention. I cannot use 
country fixed effects, since this precludes the inclusion of time-invariant variables (such as LC). I use an 
exhaustive set of country-specific variables, thereby minimizing the chances of omitting country-specific 
variables that could be correlated with explanatory variables. I follow previous studies that use panel models 
with time-invariant variables (e.g., Degryse et al. (2012)). The second concern is the potential endogeneity 
between the dependent variable and some of the control variables. For example, the level of globalization 
could be endogenous to the economic growth rate, in that faster-growing economies could be more likely to 
become integrated, and integrated economies could be more likely to grow faster. To mitigate the effects of 
such potential endogenous relations and maintain the simplicity and uniformity of the analysis, I lag 
Population, GDPPC, GDPG, HC, and EF by one year. Lagging potentially endogenous explanatory variables 
is a common method used to mitigate endogeneity issues (Carrieri et al., 2013; Desbordes, 2007). 
Globalization could affect a country’s composition of language speakers; for example, the number of people 
speaking English in a host country could increase because of incoming FDI from English-speaking countries. 
However, the impact of reverse causality is likely to be minimal, since these changes occur very slowly and 
their magnitude is unlikely to be considerable. Therefore, LC is considered an exogenous variable. I believe 
this assumption to be reasonable, given that language is usually considered a slowly changing variable. All 
estimations are estimated with robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
5.2. Results 
The estimated results of the main specification are shown in column (1) in Table 4. The variable LC is 
positive and significant (p < 0.001), providing strong evidence of the positive impact of the LC of a country on 
its degree of globalization. Of the control variables, GC is positive and significant (p < 0.05), indicating that 
countries with greater geographical proximity to the rest of the world are more globalized. Similarly, GDPG (p 
< 0.05), Infrastructure (p < 0.001), and HC (p < 0.05) are positive and significant, indicating that higher 
economic growth and better infrastructure and human capital can facilitate a country’s globalization. 
Population is negative and significant (p < 0.01), indicating that smaller countries tend to be more integrated. 
14 
 
GDPPC and EF are positive, as expected (Ghemawat and Altman, 2013), and Tax, Tariff, and Landlocked are 
negative, as expected, but none of these measures is significant. Contrary to our expectations, RTA Size is 
nonsignificant. Countries that form trade blocks tend to be closely clustered (Kohl and Brouwer, 2014), 
suggesting that most of the effects of RTA Size could be already captured by GC. This could also be due to the 
recent proliferation of RTAs8 (Subramanian and Kessler, 2013). Not all RTAs are equally effective (Arribas et 
al., 2011) and some RTAs are political gestures rather than effectively implemented integration agreements. 
Table 5 presents a summary of the expected and estimated effects of all the control variables. 
The beta coefficients, BC,9 can be used to compare the effects of each explanatory variable on the 
globalization index. The variable LC has the largest BC (0.29), followed by GC (0.24), HC (0.16), 
Infrastructure (0.16), Population (0.15), and EF (0.07). This result clearly shows that LC is strongly related to 
the extent of a country’s globalization. 
It would be interesting to know whether the importance of LC has changed over time, particularly since 
technological developments in communication could reduce the effect of language differences over time. 
Therefore, I interact the LC index with the discrete variable Time, which changes from zero to seven as the 
year changes from 2006 to 2012. The results are reported in column (2) of Table 4. The interaction term is 
negative and significant, which indicates that the effect of LC has reduced over time. However, the coefficient 
of the interaction term (-0.223) is much smaller compared to the coefficient of the LC index (8.033); therefore, 
the language effect is diminishing only very slowly. 
Given the proliferation of the English language and its increasing use as a global lingua franca, one could 
argue that the empirical effect of LC captured here is largely a manifestation of the impact of the English 
language on globalization. To check this possibility, I deconstruct the LC index into two indexes, one for LC 
through the English language (LC English) and the other for LC through all the other languages (LC Other) 
and re-estimate the baseline model with them. The results are reported in column (3) in Table 4. Both indexes 
are positive, with LC Other having a higher significance level (p < 0.001) than LC English (p = 0.12), which is 
marginally nonsignificant. Therefore, we can be reassured that the effect of LC that we observe is not a 
manifestation of the effect of the English language alone. 
                                                 
8 More than a half of the country pairs in the sample in this study shared an RTA. 
9 The beta coefficient of the explanatory variable is equal to the product of the estimated coefficient of the explanatory 




Some languages can be more powerful than others, such as those predominantly used in the business world 
and legal system. To address this aspect, I conduct a further analysis to account for the power of languages 
based on the Power Language Index (Chan, 2016a). This index is constructed based on 20 indicators to 
measure the world’s most influential languages according to five basic opportunities offered by language: 
geography, economy, communication, knowledge and media, and diplomacy. Based on the Power Language 
Index, I divide all the languages into two groups: 1) the 10 most powerful languages and 2) the remainder of 
the languages (Chan, 2016b). I then construct two LC indexes, LC Power 10 and LC Power Rest, similar to 
when I compared English (LC English) and the rest of the languages (LC Other). I then carry out another 
analysis based on these two LC indexes. The results are reported in column (4) in Table 4. Both LC Power 10 
and LC Power Rest are significant (p < 0.01 and p < 0.001, respectively), while the estimated coefficient and 
the significance level for LC Power Rest are larger than for LC Power 10. This result shows that that the effect 
of LC that we observe is not a manifestation of the effect of powerful/major languages alone. 
I rely on the total population of countries to calculate the LC index; however, such country-level capabilities 
might not always represent the language capabilities of those directly involved in cross-border activities, such 
as when “international languages” are predominantly spoken by elites/groups that are primarily involved in 
cross-border activities. To mitigate this bias, I carry out another robustness test based on second-language 
speakers, instead of considering all the language speakers in a country. The logic behind using second-
language speakers is that those operating in investing/invested firms and as importers/exporters are more likely 
to be bilingual. Ethnologue classifies language speakers into two categories: first-language (L1) users and 
second-language (L2) users. The total number of users of a language in a country is the sum of the numbers of 
L1 and L2 users. When constructing the LC index (equation (3)), I consider all the language speakers in the 
country; that is, Pij/Pi in equation (3) represents the fraction of the population that speaks language j in country 
i. I replace this term with the fraction of the population that speaks language j as a second language in country i 
(L2) and construct another index, that is, LC(L2). In essence, LC(L2) is constructed by calculating the value of 
(Pwj - Pij)/ Pwj for each language and weighting it by the fraction of the population in that country that speaks 
that language as a second language and, finally, taking the aggregate over all the languages. I then carry out 




To make sure that the empirical effect of LC captured here is not a manifestation of the impact of 
multilingual countries—since countries in which the population speaks multiple languages are more globalized 
than other countries—I carry out a further robustness test by including the total number of second-language 
speakers (L2) in the country as a percentage of the total population (L2 Speakers) alongside the LC index. The 
results are reported in column (6) in Table 4. This variable L2 Speakers is nonsignificant, while LC remained 
significant. This result shows that being a “multilingual country” (rather than a country whose language is 
spoken elsewhere) alone is not enough to be more interconnected. 
To make sure that the LC–globalization relation observed is not driven by a few types of cross-border 
activities and to investigate the impact of LC on different cross-border activities, I extend the analysis to the 
four pillars included in the depth index of globalization. In all the following estimations, the dependent 
variable measures the extent of international flows in that activity, compared to the overall (domestic and 
cross-border) measure in question or the domestic measure (see Appendix B for the operationalization of each 
dependent variable). The estimated results for the trade and investment pillars are reported in Table 6. First, LC 
is positive and significant for overall trade intensity (p < 0.01). In terms of the different trade categories, LC is 
positive for all of them and significant for all of them except merchandise exports and services imports. The 
estimated beta coefficient of LC is significantly higher for services trade (0.44) than for merchandise trade 
(0.25), showing that language is more important for services than for merchandise trade. Among the different 
trade categories (services/merchandise and exports/imports), the highest beta coefficient for LC is for services 
exports (0.53), indicating the crucial role of LC in attaining more services exports. In terms of the control 
variables,10 GC remains positive and significant in all the estimates, clearly showing the importance of 
geographical connectedness in trade intensity. Except for GDPPC and Tariff, all the control variables perform 
similarly as in the previous results. The variable GDPPC has now become negative and significant, indicating 
that countries with lower incomes tend to have greater trade intensity. Unsurprisingly, Tariff is now significant 
for merchandise trade. 
The variable LC is positive for both FDI and FPI, showing the importance of LC for cross-border investment 
flows. However, LC is significant only for FDI flows. This result could reflect the smaller role of language in 
FPI, which demands less foreign investor involvement and is less knowledge intensive than FDI. In contrast, 
language plays a crucial role in FDI in both the selection and the management of international ventures. The 
                                                 
10 Due to space constraints, the results for the control variables are not tabulated here but are available upon request. 
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variable GC is only significant for FDI outflows, indicating that geographical connectedness is less crucial for 
FDI relative to trade. 
Table 7 reports the estimated results for the information and people pillars. Again, LC is positive for all 
types of cross-border information flows and significant for all except outgoing telephone calls. The variable 
GC remains positive and significant in all cases, except for incoming telephone calls. The variable LC is 
positive for all types of cross-border people flows, but significant only for inbound tourists. Of the three types 
of people flows, the standard error of the estimated coefficient for long-term movement (migration) is much 
higher relative to that for medium-term (university students) and short-term (tourism) movements. These 
results could indicate that long-term movements are the least sensitive to language. 
Finally, I re-estimate the results using the LIC index. Column (7) in Table 4 provides the results of the main 
specification. As with the LC index, LIC is positive and significant (p < 0.05). Therefore, countries in which 
people speak languages belonging to large linguistic families are more globalized. Table 8 reports the 
estimated impact of LIC on different cross-border activities.11 Although these results are qualitatively similar 
to those for LC, they are generally less significant. A notable deviation from the previous set of results is that 
LIC is largely nonsignificant for international telephone usage, which could reflect the fact that linguistic 
proximity does not facilitate direct communication. In contrast, LIC remains very significant for trade intensity 
in printed publications, probably reflecting the ease of translation between linguistically close languages. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Due to many benefits attributed to globalization, the barriers and enablers of globalization are of interest to 
policymakers and firms. The findings of this study provide strong support for the premise that a country’s 
globalization level depends on its LC to the rest of the world. LC is found to have a larger effect than other 
determinants of globalization. Its effect is also evident in all four pillars, particularly in trade, investment, and 
information flows. In essence, these results strongly indicate that a country’s language profile is a key 
determinant of its destiny in the globalization process. 
The impact of LC is not solely driven by the English language. Interestingly, LC through other languages 
has a more significant effect than LC through the English language. Although English is widely recognized as 
                                                 
11 For brevity, only the estimated coefficient on LIC is reported, but all the specifications include all the control variables. 
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the dominant lingua franca in international business, these results indicate that other popular languages, such as 
French, Spanish, and Portuguese, can also play a significant role in the globalization process. 
The impact of LC is stronger for services trade than for merchandise trade. This finding aligns with 
anecdotal evidence that shows some countries with low LC have significant participation in global trade and 
FDI in the manufacturing sectors, but are less active in trade/FDI in the services sectors. For example, Japan is 
ranked last in the LC index (Appendix A) and most Japanese MNEs are largely product driven (Neeley, 2013). 
China is ranked fifth from the bottom in terms of the LC index, and the majority of Chinese exports and FDI 
has taken place in the manufacturing sectors. Services require simultaneity, inseparability, and perishability, 
characteristics that do not apply to product manufacture (Boddewyn et al., 1986). Therefore, service delivery 
requires simultaneous interpersonal communications—typically face-to-face contact—and active involvement 
between customers and service providers, which makes language traits more important for services trade than 
for manufacturing trade. 
The results also show that a country’s geographical connectedness to the rest of the world strongly 
influences its globalization level. This result corroborates those of Nachum et al. (2008), who have found that 
US MNEs make greater FDIs in countries that are proximate to the world’s knowledge and markets. This study 
shows that similar dynamics manifest in other forms of inbound and outbound cross-border flows. 
 
6.1 Implications of the study 
This study has many implications for national policymakers (countries), firms, and individuals. First, by 
identifying the crucial enablers and barriers to globalization, it provides insights for policymakers who wish to 
foster globalization. Countries differ in terms of their linguistic endowments largely due to their different 
exposures to conquests, slavery, migrations, and colonization (Michalopoulos, 2012), and some countries are 
fortunate to have inherited widely spoken languages. However, deliberate language policy choices can also 
affect LC. For example, the Eastern European countries that were previously part of the Soviet Union changed 
their official language from Russian to national languages (Danzer and Dietz, 2014). In contrast, English 
(which was introduced during the British occupation) remained the official language of Singapore and India. 
Policymakers in countries that rely primarily on vernacular languages that are rarely spoken outside the 
country could follow suit, or otherwise support second-language competency in a widely spoken language in 
the world or a lingua franca. National policymakers need to make language learning central to their education 
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policies, and difficult choices could be necessary in terms of deciding what languages need to be promoted and 
which ones discouraged. The findings of this study also imply that a country being multilingual alone is not 
enough to have greater interconnectedness; therefore, choosing the right language(s) is particularly important. 
Of course, such a language choice should only be made after careful consideration of many other 
factors/concerns, such as pedagogical efficiency and linguistic democracy; however, the influence of LC on 
globalization documented here provides vital information for evaluating such language policy decisions. A less 
controversial approach could be to simply encourage additional languages (relevant business languages and 
widely spoken languages) to be taught in schools. 
The LC index provides a unique gauge to measure the relative language capabilities (and barriers) of 
countries, particularly in terms of their capacity to engage in cross-border activities. The example of Japan, 
once called the factory of the world, is suggestive. The country ranks last on the LC and LIC indexes and 
113rd out of 139 countries in the globalization index. Japan’s linguistic isolation is likely to pose serious 
challenges to its process of globalization and its future economic prosperity, particularly due to the rising 
importance of services in globalization. A similar analogy can be made for China, which ranks very low in the 
LC and globalization indexes. With the growth of services and knowledge-intensive sectors and the increase in 
the complexity of spatial transactions requiring face-to-face communications and shorter lead times (Kohl and 
Brouwer, 2014), the problem associated with lower LC could become more severe for such countries. 
This study also has implications for supranational institutions (both global and regional) that advocate 
greater integration among countries. If LC is the most crucial enabler of globalization, then the important 
question is, what is the best geolinguistic strategy to make the world more interlingual or linguistically 
integrated? Is it the promotion of universal multilingualism or an attempt to achieve hegemonic world 
monolingualism, probably through English? Or a mix of both strategies, or the promotion of a few auxiliary 
international languages? There is no easy answer to these questions, since each strategy has its own set of pros 
and cons; for example, hegemonic world monolingualism clashes with the notion of linguistic democracy, and 
multilingualism comes at a higher cost and has greater inefficiency (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005; Maurais, 
2003). Nevertheless, LC is largely structural in nature. The implementation of language policies can be quite 
challenging, since languages are deeply embedded in the roots of individuals and countries and changing them 
is quite difficult, particularly in the short/medium term. The real impact of language policy becomes visible 
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decades and sometimes generations after its implementation. Language barriers remain the stickiest hindrance 
to globalization, even as technology and open policies continue to encourage the flattening of the world. 
Finally, this study has implications for firms (managerial implications) and individuals. Both firms and 
individuals that originate from countries with low LC could find it difficult to engage in cross-border activities 
due to the language barrier, and their destination choices will be limited due to linguistic boundaries. To 
surmount the problem, such firms might have to invest in training their staff in a widely spoken language or a 
lingua franca. 
 
6.2. Limitations of the study 
Despite its merits, this study is not without limitations. First, it should be noted that language statistics are by 
no means complete and up-to-date for all the countries, particularly when it comes to the statistics of second-
language speakers. Nevertheless, since Ethnologue is the most comprehensive source of language statistics, 
and given its large coverage of languages and countries and good coverage of second-language speakers, I 
believe that the LC index calculated in this study is a reliable measure. It is also reassuring that the ratio of 
total language speakers in a country to its population is greater than 1.0 for most countries and greater than 2.0 
for some, indicating good coverage of bilingual and multilingual speakers. Second, I rely on the total 
populations of countries to calculate the LC index, and such country-level capabilities might not always 
represent the language capabilities of those directly involved in cross-border activities. However, I try to 
mitigate this bias by using the number of second-language speakers instead of considering all the language 
speakers in the country. The third limitation relates to the LIC index. Although I use Ethnologue’s genetic 
classification (top-level genetic groups) and assume that the languages within these groups are more closely 
related and the languages between these groups more distantly related, I do not account for differences 
between sublevel language groups. Additionally, there can be instances in which the language family 
affiliations are not that clear, particularly when it comes to hybrid languages that could have more than one 




Appendix A: The LC and LIC indexes and the depth index of globalization 
Rank Country LC index LIC index 
Depth index of 
globalization (2012) 
1 Luxembourg 1.96 2.47 46 
2 Belgium 1.58 1.96 43 
3 Denmark 1.54 2.50 34 
4 Sweden 1.51 2.19 35 
5 Finland 1.38 2.10 30 
6 Bolivia 1.37 1.61 15 
7 Paraguay 1.33 1.37 16 
8 Slovak Republic 1.28 1.99 32 
9 Moldova 1.27 1.41 26 
10 Latvia 1.25 2.27 32 
11 Singapore 1.25 1.25 47 
12 Lithuania 1.23 2.11 33 
13 Honduras 1.17 1.19 24 
14 Hong Kong  1.17 1.26 50 
15 Panama 1.15 1.18 35 
16 United Kingdom 1.14 1.23 28 
17 Uruguay 1.11 1.12 15 
18 Estonia 1.10 1.85 37 
19 New Zealand 1.10 1.16 25 
20 El Salvador 1.08 1.10 18 
21 Cyprus 1.08 1.17 31 
22 Slovenia 1.06 2.05 33 
23 Ireland 1.05 1.27 43 
24 Canada 1.03 1.06 28 
25 Botswana 1.02 1.14 21 
26 Argentina 1.02 1.09 9 
27 Guatemala 1.00 1.13 15 
28 Dominican Republic 0.99 1.01 16 
29 Portugal 0.99 1.04 28 
30 Croatia 0.99 1.59 26 
31 Germany 0.98 1.74 30 
32 Nicaragua 0.98 0.99 25 
33 Australia 0.97 0.99 21 
34 Costa Rica 0.96 0.97 23 
35 Colombia 0.94 1.02 12 
36 Ecuador 0.94 1.05 14 
37 Lebanon 0.93 1.18 34 
38 Spain 0.90 1.23 25 
39 Chile 0.90 0.92 26 
40 Peru 0.89 1.02 15 
41 France 0.86 1.20 26 
42 Mauritius 0.86 1.37 32 
43 Czech Republic 0.81 1.63 33 
44 Greece 0.80 1.61 19 
45 Mexico 0.77 0.98 20 
46 Switzerland 0.77 1.21 36 
47 United States 0.77 0.96 18 
48 Malaysia 0.71 1.31 37 
49 Kazakhstan 0.70 0.93 25 
50 Italy 0.66 1.83 24 
51 Tunisia 0.66 1.53 24 
52 Nepal 0.63 1.29 6 
53 Austria 0.62 1.13 36 
54 Armenia 0.56 1.11 21 
55 Kyrgyz Republic 0.55 0.94 22 
56 Jordan 0.55 0.98 30 
57 Serbia 0.52 1.33 25 




Appendix A (continued) 
 
Rank Country LC index LIC index 
Depth Index of 
globalization (2012) 
59 Bangladesh 0.49 1.78 4 
60 Mozambique 0.48 1.12 17 
61 Philippines 0.48 1.45 13 
62 Albania 0.47 1.18 24 
63 Romania 0.46 1.24 21 
64 Israel 0.45 1.14 29 
65 South Africa 0.45 2.24 21 
66 Poland 0.45 1.34 28 
67 Venezuela 0.44 0.46 7 
68 Hungary 0.42 0.76 36 
69 Nigeria 0.42 1.13 16 
70 Netherlands 0.40 1.17 42 
71 Georgia 0.39 0.44 26 
72 Korea, Republic 0.38 0.38 29 
73 Namibia 0.37 1.06 24 
74 Benin 0.36 0.98 10 
75 Pakistan 0.35 1.37 5 
76 Senegal 0.35 1.18 16 
77 Macedonia 0.32 0.97 28 
78 Morocco 0.32 1.14 22 
79 Guinea 0.31 0.99 19 
80 Russian Federation 0.29 1.05 17 
81 Ukraine 0.28 0.89 27 
82 Azerbaijan 0.28 1.70 20 
83 Burkina Faso 0.28 0.86 10 
84 Sri Lanka 0.28 1.14 10 
85 Malawi 0.27 0.91 15 
86 Chad 0.26 0.73 16 
87 Oman 0.26 0.57 30 
88 India 0.23 0.71 10 
89 Mali 0.22 1.58 11 
90 Bahrain 0.22 0.47 37 
91 Kuwait 0.21 0.25 27 
92 Cameroon 0.18 0.65 10 
93 Jamaica 0.17 0.95 24 
94 Kenya 0.16 0.97 13 
95 Turkey 0.16 0.85 15 
96 Iran 0.15 1.14 2 
97 Uganda 0.15 0.85 10 
98 Angola 0.14 0.82 17 
99 Saudi Arabia 0.14 0.59 24 
100 Cambodia 0.13 0.85 30 
101 Rwanda 0.12 0.67 9 
102 Qatar 0.12 0.12 27 
103 Ghana 0.10 1.07 19 
104 Egypt 0.10 0.81 11 
105 Ethiopia 0.08 0.79 7 
106 Guyana 0.07 0.89 33 
107 Burundi 0.07 1.27 5 
108 Mongolia 0.07 0.97 31 
109 Madagascar 0.05 0.81 12 
110 Norway 0.05 0.95 31 
111 China 0.04 0.12 10 
112 Thailand 0.04 0.46 31 
113 Iceland 0.03 0.60 33 
114 Indonesia 0.03 0.52 9 





Appendix B: Variable descriptions, measurement, and data sources 
Variable Description/Measurement Data Source 
LC Language connectedness index Constructed using 
language data obtained 
from Lewis et al. (2014) 
LIC Linguistic connectedness index 
DIG Depth index of globalization Ghemawat and Altman 
(2013) 
GC  Geographical connectedness, constructed using the GDP (WDI) 
and geographical distance (Rose and Spiegel (2011)) 
WDI, Rose and Spiegel 
(2011) 
Landlocked A binary variable that equals unity if the country is landlocked Central Intelligence 
Agency World Factbook 
RTA Size The cumulative GDP of all the countries with which the focal 
country shares an RTA, constructed using the GDP (WDI) and the 
RTA (Rose and Spiegel (2011)) for 2006 and updated 2007–2012 
from the World Trade Organization) 
WDI, 
Rose and Spiegel (2011); 
World Trade Organization 
Population Population  WDI 
GDPPC GDP per capita  
GDPG GDP growth rate  
HC Human capital measured as secondary school enrollment (percent 
gross) 
Tax Total tax rate  Global Competitiveness 
Index Tariff Average rate of trade tariffs 
Infrastructure Multi-indicator measure of infrastructure based on the quality of 
the overall infrastructure, roads, railroad infrastructure, port 
infrastructure, and air transport infrastructure; number of available 
airline seat kilometers; the quality of the electricity supply; and the 
numbers of mobile telephone subscriptions and fixed telephone 
lines 
EF Index of Economic Freedom  Heritage Foundation 
(http://www.heritage.org/i
ndex/) 
Trade Total trade as a percentage of the GDP Ghemawat and Altman 
(2013)  Merchandise Trade Total merchandise trade as a percentage of the GDP 
Services Trade Total trade of commercial services as a percentage of the GDP 
Merchandise Exports Total merchandise exports as a percentage of the GDP 
Merchandise Imports Total merchandise imports as a percentage of the GDP 
Services Exports Total exports of commercial services as a percentage of the GDP 
Services Imports Total imports of commercial services as a percentage of the GDP 
FDI Outflows FDI outflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation 
(average of the current year and the two previous years) 
 
FDI Inflows FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation 




Equity securities assets (net) as a percentage of the GDP (average 




Equity securities liabilities (net) as a percentage of the GDP 
(average of the current year and the two previous years) 
 
Internet Bandwidth International Internet bandwidth per Internet user  
Outgoing Telephone Total outgoing telephone calling minutes per capita (TDM + VoIP).  
Incoming Telephone Total incoming telephone calling minutes per capita (TDM + VoIP)  
Printed Publications 
Exports 
Total exports of HS49 per capita, where HS49 includes printed 




Total imports of HS49 per capita, where HS49 includes printed 
books, newspapers, pictures, manuscripts, typescripts, and plans  
 
Outbound Migrants International outbound migrants’ share of the population.  
Inbound Migrants International inbound migrants’ share of the population.  
Outgoing International 
Students 
Total number of students studying abroad as a percentage of the 






Total number of foreign students as a percentage of the total 
number of tertiary students in the country 
 
Inbound Tourists Inbound tourists, that is, the number of arrivals of non-resident 
overnight visitors (tourists) at national borders as a percentage of 
the total population 
 
Outbound Tourists Outbound tourists, that is, the number of departures of overnight 
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Table 1: The top five and the bottom five countries in the LC index 
Rank Country LC index 
    1 Luxembourg 1.96 
    2 Belgium 1.58 
    3 Denmark 1.54 
    4 Sweden 1.51 
    5 Finland 1.38 
111 China 0.04 
112 Thailand 0.04 
113 Iceland 0.03 
114 Indonesia 0.03 
115 Japan 0.02 
 
 
Table 2: The top five and the bottom five countries in the LIC index 
Rank Country LIC index 
   1 Denmark  2.5 
   2 Luxembourg 2.47 
   3 Latvia 2.27 
   4 South Africa 2.24 
   5 Sweden 2.19 
111 Korea, Republic 0.38 
112 Kuwait 0.25 
113 Qatar 0.12 
114 China 0.12 









Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix  
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Correlation Coefficients 
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 DIG 22.47 10.35 1 50                
2 LC 0.66 0.43 0.02 1.96 0.41               
3 LC English 0.12 0.25 0 0.99 0.22 0.39              
4 LC Other 0.53 0.41 0.02 1.96 0.3 0.82 -0.21             
5 LIC 1.17 0.48 0.02 2.5 0.32 0.66 0.31 0.51            
6 GC 2.07 0.7 0.87 4.13 0.29 -0.13 -0.06 -0.1 0.18           
7 Landlocked 0.22 0.42 0 1 -0.08 -0.05 -0.17 0.05 0.06 0.16          
8 RTA Size 20.54 12.91 4.55 52.68 0.03 0.16 -0.07 0.21 0.05 -0.04 -0.27         
9 Population 0.05 0.18 0 1.34 -0.27 -0.22 0 -0.24 -0.25 0 -0.13 0.29        
10 GDPPC 16.46 20.28 0.16 112.03 0.56 0.31 0.43 0.06 0.19 0.17 -0.12 0.08 -0.1       
11 GDPG 4.05 4.5 -17.95 34.5 -0.2 -0.18 -0.19 -0.07 -0.17 -0.02 0.11 -0.06 0.16 -0.25      
12 Tax 45.55 22.95 10.6 286.7 -0.29 -0.01 -0.09 0.04 0.03 -0.17 0.09 0.06 0.16 -0.14 0.02     
13 Tariff 5.4 5.57 0 55.8 -0.51 -0.32 -0.2 -0.21 -0.18 -0.01 0.07 0.11 0.18 -0.4 0.23 0.16    
14 Infrastructure 3.99 1.28 1.47 6.77 0.66 0.34 0.39 0.12 0.17 0.17 -0.29 0.16 0 0.75 -0.29 -0.18 -0.46   
15 HC 82.79 26.51 13.15 147.62 0.62 0.38 0.31 0.21 0.21 0.13 -0.25 0.27 -0.11 0.59 -0.24 -0.14 -0.48 0.71  











Table 4: Estimated results for the depth index of globalization  
 Dependent variable: Depth index of globalization (DIG) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
LC 6.944*** 8.033***    7.299***  
 (1.812) (2.021)    (2.006)  
LC × Time  -0.223*      
  (0.126)      
Time  0.262**      
  (0.127)      
LC English   5.108     
   (3.292)     
LC Other   7.280***     
   (1.791)     
LC Power 10    5.733***    
    (1.987)    
LC Power Rest    13.18***    
    (3.069)    
LC(L2)     7.072***   
     (1.924)   
L2 Speakers      -0.00784  
      (0.0160)  
LIC       3.622*** 
       (1.355) 
GC 3.592** 3.496** 3.545** 2.626* 2.414* 3.708*** 2.608** 
 (1.402) (1.397) (1.405) (1.490) (1.245) (1.423) (1.267) 
Landlocked -1.204 -1.326 -1.336 -1.883 -1.024 -1.207 -1.057 
 (1.538) (1.563) (1.540) (1.643) (1.576) (1.536) (1.650) 
RTA Size -0.0409 -0.0427 -0.0436 -0.0384 -0.0336 -0.0408 -0.0341 
 (0.0311) (0.0313) (0.0318) (0.0312) (0.0302) (0.0311) (0.0305) 
Population -8.837*** -9.230*** -8.563** -8.326*** -11.04*** -8.677*** -9.715*** 
 (3.373) (3.449) (3.335) (3.169) (3.507) (3.351) (3.658) 
GDPPC 0.00340 0.0111 0.00622 0.00773 0.00435 0.00353 0.0134 
 (0.0254) (0.0256) (0.0258) (0.0256) (0.0233) (0.0255) (0.0236) 
GDPG 0.0643** 0.0639** 0.0641** 0.0636** 0.0632** 0.0643** 0.0632** 
 (0.0280) (0.0275) (0.0279) (0.0280) (0.0281) (0.0280) (0.0281) 
Tax -0.00633 -0.00496 -0.00637 -0.00589 -0.00607 -0.00633 -0.00639 
 (0.00450) (0.00438) (0.00448) (0.00465) (0.00475) (0.00451) (0.00482) 
Tariff -0.0269 -0.0305* -0.0274 -0.0273 -0.0295* -0.0267 -0.0311* 
 (0.0170) (0.0163) (0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0166) (0.0170) (0.0169) 
Infrastructure 1.294*** 1.349*** 1.315*** 1.269*** 1.312*** 1.296*** 1.371*** 
 (0.378) (0.373) (0.378) (0.378) (0.388) (0.379) (0.388) 
HC 0.0633** 0.0498* 0.0645** 0.0641** 0.0759*** 0.0625** 0.0750*** 
 (0.0285) (0.0299) (0.0284) (0.0282) (0.0272) (0.0286) (0.0275) 
EF 0.0756 0.0724 0.0786 0.0741 0.0892* 0.0746 0.0911* 
 (0.0534) (0.0528) (0.0540) (0.0530) (0.0540) (0.0535) (0.0543) 
Constant -3.442 -3.094 -3.640 -2.096 -0.211 -3.569 -3.653 
 (3.936) (3.855) (3.912) (3.983) (3.822) (3.931) (4.092) 
N 660 660 660 660 660 660 660 
Countries 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 
R2 0.580 0.576 0.587 0.601 0.581 0.580 0.584 
χ2 572.8*** 552.8*** 588.3*** 600.9*** 510.3*** 569.6*** 478.5*** 
 
Notes: Of the countries listed in Appendix A, Singapore could not be included in the regressions due to 
unavailability of data for the HC variable. Year-specific fixed effects are not reported here for brevity. 










Control variable  Expected effect Estimated effect 
GC Positive Positive 
Landlocked Negative Nonsignificant  
RTA Size Positive Nonsignificant 
Population Negative Negative 
GDPPC Positive Nonsignificant 
GDPG Positive Positive 
Tax Negative Nonsignificant 
Tariff Negative Negative in some estimations 
Infrastructure Positive Positive 
HC Positive Positive 
EF Positive Nonsignificant 
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Table 6: Estimated results for the trade and investment pillars 
 






 Trade Pillar  Investment Pillar 
 (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6) (3.7)  (3.8) (3.9) (3.10) (3.11) 




















LC 44.29*** 25.39** 19.26** 8.572 16.82*** 14.43** 4.778  15.86* 15.92* 3.571 18.03 
 (13.71) (10.50) (9.486) (5.758) (5.588) (6.077) (3.411)  (8.830) (8.982) (2.522) (15.80) 
N 658 658 658 658 658 658 658  638 659 575 566 
Countries 114 114 114 114 114 114 114  110 114 98 96 
R2 0.291 0.264 0.166 0.239 0.252 0.203 0.121  0.393 0.120 0.283 0.125 
χ2 217.3*** 232.8*** 50.99*** 170.6*** 217.3*** 49.57*** 79.16***  66.27*** 43.46*** 59.82*** 9.258 
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Table 7: Estimated results for the information and people pillars 
 
Notes: Control variables and year-specific fixed effects are not reported for brevity. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10  
 Information Pillar  People Pillar 




























LC 130,604* 114.4 91.41** 30.02*** 24.16**  0.146 1.199 13.13 3.484 0.289** 0.663 
 (71,456) (76.76) (40.66) (8.854) (9.897)  (2.110) (3.405) (11.78) (3.528) (0.140) (0.515) 
N 660 564 564 651 651  467 467 441 528 536 423 
Countries 114 112 112 112 112  110 110 104 92 107 78 
R2 0.243 0.375 0.359 0.393 0.582  0.0189 0.137 0.0488 0.287 0.372 0.223 
χ2 119.7*** 54.33*** 115.9*** 93.81*** 117.3***  56.42*** 50.01*** 33.98*** 32.08** 88.68*** 62.40*** 
34 
 
Table 8: Estimated coefficients for the LIC index for the trade, investment, information and people pillars 
Trade pillar   
Trade Merchandise Trade Services Trade Merchandise Exports Merchandise Imports Services Exports Services Imports 
19.91** 9.017 11.16 1.267 7.716** 8.216* 2.904 
(9.811) (6.149) (7.228) (3.874) (3.451) (4.733) (2.493) 
        
Investment pillar   




   
7.693 5.977 2.172 10.43    
(6.066) (6.515) (1.601) (9.687)    
        
Information 









80,510 -46.81 6.802 22.83*** 15.18**   
(50,389) (70.95) (33.29) (4.836) (7.308)   
        
People pillar   
Outbound 
Migrants 




Inbound Tourists Outbound Tourists  
0.470 -5.422 6.939 -0.669 0.0395 0.130  
(1.349) (4.183) (8.123) (3.073) (0.180) (0.0993)  
Notes: The estimated results for the control variables are qualitatively similar to the previous sets of results with the LC index and are not tabulated here for brevity. Year-specific fixed effects 
are included but not reported for brevity. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
